where p refers to a party's vote share, o refers to parties that contested only the election at time t, w refers to parties that contested only the election at time t + 1, and stable parties refer to those parties that competed in elections at times t and t + 1. They then calculate volatility across eighty-nine pairs of elections in twentyone post-communist countries from 1989 to 2009. Their data comprise the largest dataset on volatility in post-communist Europe and represent a valuable contribution to the existing literature. Powell and Tucker use their data to re-examine the causes of party system volatility in post-communist countries. Specifically, they investigate how a host of economic, political and institutional variables that have been employed in previous studies affect replacement and electoral volatility. 7 Their results, which we were able to verify, 8 are shown in the first two columns of Table 1 . As the results in the first column indicate, there is no evidence that electoral volatility varies in a statistically significant way with any of the covariates from the existing theoretical literature.
As already indicated, though, the vast majority of party system volatility in post-communist Europe is driven by replacement volatility. The results in the second column of Table 1 indicate that GDP Change From 1989 is the only statistically significant determinant of replacement volatility. GDP Change From 1989 is calculated as the ratio of GDP in a given election year to GDP in 1989, and is designed to 'tap into overall voter satisfaction with the performance of the current government […] relative to the previous communist era'. 9 The negative and statistically significant coefficient on GDP Change From 1989 indicates that replacement volatility decreases with 'long-term economic recovery'. 10 Powell and Tucker state that 'such a finding fits in very well with big-picture theoretical ideas about the extended role of the transition in structuring post-communist political behavior (Kitschelt et al., 1999; Tucker, 2006) '. 11 As we now demonstrate, though, there are strong reasons to doubt the claim that long-term economic performance is driving replacement volatility in post-communist Europe. In Figure 1 , we plot replacement volatility against GDP Change From 1989. Recall that values of GDP Change From 1989 less than 1 indicate that election-year GDP is less than GDP in 1989, and that values greater than 1 indicate how many times larger election-year GDP is compared to GDP in 1989. The downward-sloping solid black line represents the fitted values from a bivariate regression of replacement volatility against GDP Change From 1989; the dashed black lines represent two-tailed 95 per cent confidence intervals.
It should be immediately clear that the three observations from Bosnia-Herzegovina are distinct outliers with respect to GDP Change From 1989. Whereas the mean value of this covariate is 5.66 for Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is only 0.98 (σ = 0.39) for the remaining eighty-six observations. In fact, the average value for Bosnia-Herzegovina is fully 2.78 times larger than the next-largest value, Poland 2007. An obvious concern is that the negative relationship between replacement volatility and long-term 6 Birch (2003, 123-4) provides two measures of electoral volatility, one of which is the same as Powell and Tucker's Type B Volatility; her measure of replacement volatility differs from Powell and Tucker's Type A Volatility.
7 For specific information on each of the covariates, see Powell and Tucker (2014, 13-15) . 8 Herrnson 1995. 9 Powell and Tucker 2014, 13. 10 Powell and Tucker 2014, 1. 11 Powell and Tucker 2014, 21. economic performance reported by Powell and Tucker is being driven by the unusual observations for Bosnia-Herzegovina.
To examine this possibility, we re-estimated our models after dropping the observations from Bosnia-Herzegovina. The results, which are shown in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 , indicate that none of the covariates discussed in the existing theoretical literature has a statistically significant effect on electoral or replacement volatility. Most relevant is the fact that there is no longer any evidence to support Powell and Tucker's claim that replacement volatility is driven by long-term economic performance. While the coefficient on GDP Change From 1989 remains negative, it is far from being statistically significant; indeed, the standard error is now larger than the coefficient. A jackknife procedure, in which we sequentially drop each country one at a time and then re-estimate the models for each of the reduced datasets, reveals that it is only the outlier observations from Bosnia-Herzegovina that are substantively influencing the results.
Yet the values of GDP Change From 1989 for Bosnia-Herzegovina are not just highly unusual; they are, in fact, incorrect. Recall that GDP Change From 1989 is supposed to be calculated as the ratio of GDP Although a choice like this might ordinarily be expected to cause few problems, this is not the case here. We were able to locate economic data back to 1989 for Bosnia-Herzegovina from the EBRD's more recent Transition Report 2012. 14 In Figure 2 Although GDP was more than five to six times larger in the 2000s than it was in 1994 (the values calculated by Powell and Tucker) , it actually remained less than it was in 1989. Once we use 1989 as the baseline year, it soon becomes clear that the long-term economic performance of Bosnia-Herzegovina is not unusual at allthe mean value of GDP Change Since 1989 is 0.64, less than one standard deviation from the sample mean. In Columns 5 and 6 of Table 1 , we present results from models in which we substitute in the correct data for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Using the correct data, there is no evidence that replacement (or electoral) volatility in post-communist Europe is driven by long-term economic performance.
In their recent article, Powell and Tucker revisit the determinants of party system volatility in postcommunist Europe. They conclude that replacement volatility is 'largely a function of long-term economic recovery'. 15 As we have demonstrated, though, this conclusion is based entirely on a miscalculation of the long-term economic performance of a single country, Bosnia-Herzegovina. To the extent that Powell and Tucker have correctly identified the key theoretical variables in the existing literature, our reanalysis suggests that we know little about what causes party system volatility in post-communist Europe. None of the variables they propose has a statistically significant effect on either electoral or replacement volatility. Given the negative consequences traditionally associated with party system volatility, this area of research cries out for new theoretical development. (Zettelmeyer, Ricka and Sanfey 2012, 103) . GDP is set to 1 in 1989. The filled black dot and vertical dashed gray line indicates the baseline year -1994used by Powell and Tucker (2014) for calculating GDP Change Since 1989. 15 Powell and Tucker 2014, 1. 
